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VIRGINIA COMMENTS

VIRGINIA COMMENTS
VIRGINIA LAW ON JOINT BANK ACCOUNTS
The recent Virginia case of Quesenberry v. Funk' deals with the
disposition of funds remaining in a joint and survivor bank account 2
after the death of the original owner and depositor of the funds. This
case follows earlier ones which, during the past decade, have established as Virginia law the position that there is a presumption3 that
such an account was created for the benefit and convenience of the
depositor; therefore, the survivor attempting to claim the funds must
prove that the depositor intended to make a gratuitous transfer to
him and took such steps as would accomplish that result.4
The action was instituted by five of the children and residuary
legatees of W. S. Coalson against another child and residuary legatee,
Mrs. Thelma C. Quesenberry, who with the decedent was a co-depositor of the account, and against her husband, W. Eugene Quesenberry,
executor of the will of the decedent. The account was the ordinary
joint-and-survivor type, the usual signature card 5 having been properly filed with the bank. There was conflicting evidence as to whether
the decedent intended for Mrs. Quesenberry, who attended to his
business and provided some of the personal attention he required, to
12o3 Va. 6g, 125 S.E.2d 869 (1962).
2
The term "joint account" will be used hereinafter to mean an account with
survivorship provisions unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.
OThe word "presumption" has several meanings and it is not clear which meaning is intended by the Virginia court. From a reading of the cases involved it would
seem to mean the risk of nonpersuasion and certain portions of this comment are
predicated upon the assumption that this is the intended meaning. For a discussion
of presumptions, see Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions,
52 Mich. L. Rev. 195 (1953).
'Wrenn v. Daniels, 2oo Va. 419, io6 S.E.2d 126 (1958). King v. Merryman, 196
Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955).
'A card furnished by the Pulaski National Bank, where the funds in question
were deposited, and said to be of the type executed by Mr. Coalson and Mrs.
Quesenberry reads as follows:
"The undersigned joint depositors, hereby agree each with the other and
with the above bank that all sums now on deposit heretofore or hereafter
deposited by either or both of said joint depositiors with the said bank to
their credit as such joint depositors with all accumulations thereon, are and
shall be owned by them jointly, with right of survivorship and be subject
to the check or receipt of either of them or the survivor of them and payment to or on the check of either or the survivor shall be valid and discharge said bank from liability...."
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have the funds remaining in the account at the time of his death,
or whether he intended the fund to become a part of his estate. The
trial judge thought that the parole evidence introduced by the defendant was insufficient to prove a valid transfer,6 and held for the petitioners on the basis of prior authority that the form of the deposit
is not evidence of donative intent.7 The Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia refused to upset that finding.
The joint bank account is a common feature of modern banking,
and realistic discussion of such accounts must be predicated upon this
fact. The question is not one of legal recognition, but rather the
extent to which the survivorship provisions are binding upon the
parties and their heirs. Is the form of the deposit, and especially the
survivorship provision, sufficient to establish that the original owner
and depositor intended to transfer some interest to the co-depositor?
Various jurisdictions have attempted to uphold transfers to the
co-depositor on common law concepts derived from the law relating
to trusts, wills, contracts, gifts, and joint tenancies. In so doing they
have ignored pertinent considerations, and legal writers have generally
concluded that there is no common law doctrine which is adequate to
deal with the problem.8
The trust theory has generally been found insufficient 9 because
usually the instrument establishing the account does not manifest the
essential intent to establish a trust.10 The thory of a bequest is insufficient because the instrument does not meet the technical requirements of a will,1" and there is a lack of the necessary testamentary
8
rhe opinion does not clearly indicate whether there was any considerable
body of evidence contrary to the trial judge's finding of fact. The record of the
case (Record No. 5419) clearly indicates the presence of such evidence.

7See note 4 supra.
OKepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account, A Concept Without a
Name, 41 Calf. L. Rev. 596 (1953); Kepner, Five More Years of the Joint Bank
Account Muddle, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 376 (1959). For other discussions of the development of the concept, see: Annot., 149 A.L.R. 862 (1944); Annot., 135 A.L.R.
993 (1941); Annot., 103 A.L.R. 1123 (1936); Annot., 66 A.L.R. 881 (1930); Annot.,
48 A.L.R. 189 (1927); Annot., x917C L.R.A. 550.
9
An exception is to be found in Maryland where there is in general use a card
with specific provisions for the establishment of a trust. These have been approved
by the courts and help to effect a transfer of ownership. Kepner, supra note 8, 26
U. Chi L. Rev. at 39o. Bierau v. Bohemian Bldg., Loan & Say. Ass'n, 205 Md. 456,
1o9 A.2d 120 (1954) goes so far as to uphold a joint bank account trust on parole
evidence of such an intention when the form of the deposit makes no mention
of either the joint depositor or trust.
"i Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 45 (195)1
The facts of -the Quesenberry case are such as to make the possibility of upholding the transfer on the bequest theory not as remote as in most cases. Mr.
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intent.' 2 The contract theory fails because the contract is between
parties as joint depositors on the one hand and the bank on the other,
and so it is not determinative of the rights of the parties between
themselves.' 3 The gift theory has been used most often, though not
without difficulty, since it is necessary to rely on parole evidence to
establish donative intent. Most courts have found it convenient to
overlook the requirements of delivery and the necessity of determining the exact interest transferred and when such interest vests.' 4 The
theory that a joint tenancy': is established by the signature card is
insufficient because technical requirements, such as the four unities,
make it impossible to establish a body of law which can be uniformly
6
applied.'
The first Virginia case involving the joint bank account was the
1917 case of Deal's Adm'r v. Merchant's and Mechanic's Say. Bank 17
which used the contract theory to give the deposit to the survivor.
Although the court explicitly relies on the contract theory, it is significant, in light of later cases, that the court also found the decedent
had manifested an intention to give the funds to the survivor.' s
In 1928 a statute 19 was passed providing that a bank might pay a
joint deposit to either party or survivor and be released from all
liability. In King v. Merryman2o this statute was interpreted as being
only for the protection of the bank and of no effect in determining the
rights of the survivor. This is in accord with the usual interpretation
placed on such statutes. 21
Quesenberry had made his mark which was witnessed by Mr Utt; on the• same
card was Mrs. Quesenberry's signature. Thus if the signature of Mrs. Quesenberry
had been accepted as that of a witness, the statutory requirement for two witnesses
would have been met.
221 Page, Wills § 1.2 (196o).
"Cerny v. Cerny, 152 Fla. 333, i So. 2d 777 (943).
"Kepner, supra note 8, 41 Calif. L. Rev. at 598-99 .
"Some cases have seemingly confused the issue by not distinguishing between joint tenancy as a distinct theory of transfer and the interest of a joint
tenant as the subject of an intervivos gift.
"Kepner, supra note 8, 41 Calif. L. Rev. at 6oo-o 3 .
1712o Va. 297, 91 S.E. 135 (1917).
8.1Id. at 298, 91 SXE. at 135.

21 Va. Code Ann. § 6-55 (1950).

2196 Va. 844, 86 S.E.2d 141 (1955).

2In 1956, following the decision in King v. Merryman and probably as a
result of that decision, the Virginia legislature provided that where a husband and
wife have a joint and survivorship account, title vests in the survivor. Va. Code
Ann. § 6-55.1 (Supp. 1962). In Johnson v. McCarthy, 202 Va. 49, 57, 115 S.E.2d
915, 921 (196o), the Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the rights of the surviving
spouse on the basis of this statute, but at the same time hinted that the statute

-,
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In King v. Merryman the court found that it had not been established that the depositor intended to transfer property rights to
the survivor, thus distinguishing the situation from that presented
earlier in Deal's Adin'r.22 Seemingly, this factual determination was
reached with the aid of the presumption 23 that such a deposit was
made for the convenience of the original depositor,24 and the holding
that a survivor claiming to the contrary would have to prove that
a transfer had been effected by a recognized common law method. 25
In 1958 in Wrenn v. Daniels,26 and again in the principal case, the
court re-affirmed the rule of King v. Merliyman. Although the court
stated that with proper evidence the rights of the survivor would be
sustained, the fact that there are no appellate cases in which the remaining funds have been awarded to the survivor 27 indicates that it is
difficult for the survivor to sustain the burden cast upon him.
The opening of a joint bank account is a seemingly simple act.
The cards that are signed employ simple language with no indication
that the words do not mean what they appear to say, and with varying
degrees of absoluteness they appear to say that the signing and filing
28
of the card is sufficient to vest a property right in the co-depositor.
It therefore seems reasonable to think that the public does not take the
same view of the joint account which Virginia courts have taken. The
evidence in the principal case, 29 as well as opinions expressed by indoes not preclude judicial probing into the intention of the parties by saying,
"He must have known of the effect of having the bank deposit made in the name
of himself and [his]wife, 'payable to either or the survivor ....' Had he intended
[otherwise] ...
it would have been a simple matter for him to have so provided."
2aKing v. Merryman, note 2o supra, at 851-52, 857, 86 S.E.2d at 144-46, 148.
'3With regard to the nature of this presumption, see note 3 supra.

2
'King v. Merryman, see note 20 supra. The court quotes with approval from
38 C.J.S. Gifts § 50, 1943.
2Id. at 851, 86 S.E.2d at 145.
2oo Va. 419, 1o6 S.E.2d 126 (1958).
2The exception to this statement is Johnson v. McCarty, note 21 supra, where
the relationship of the parties made a special statute applicable.
2A card obtained from another Virginia bank reads, "We [the depositors] agree
and declare that all funds, now, or hereafter, deposited in this account are, and
shall be, our joint property and owned by us as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and not as tenants in common; and upon the death of either of us any balance
in said account shall become the absolute property of the survivor. The entire
account or any part thereof may be withdrawn by or upon the order of, either of us
or the survivor. It is especially agreed that withdrawls of funds by the survivor
shall be binding upon us and upon our heirs, next of kin, legatees, assigns and
personal representatives." See also note 5 supra.
-"It is stated that a bank official was the first to suggest that the funds in
question were legally the property of Mrs. Quesenberry. 203 Va. at 621, 125 S.E.2d
at 872.
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dividuals in general conversation, indicate the general understanding
to be different from the judicial understanding. Having this erroneous
idea, it is not surprising that joint depositors seldom take additional
steps to demonstrate an intention to effect a transfer. This is especially
true in cases where the intention to transfer funds is secondary and the
primary purpose is to provide for the depositor's convenience. If this
misinterpretation of the law by the public does exist, there is a need
to remove the resulting conflict between the present law and the
ideas of the majority of depositors. The question is whether the law
is to be changed or the public is to be adequately informed of the
law.
The public could be informed more fully through the simple
expedient of requiring banks to print, in a conspicuous position on
the signature cards, words clearly indicating that the form of the deposit does not control the property*interest and the making of such a
deposit is not sufficient to effect a transfer. This action can cure the
most flagrant evil of the present situation, but it must have the approval of the banking interests to be effective.
Such a solution also fails to consider the need for modification
of the present law so as to make the opening of a joint account sufficient in itself to effect a property transfer. The preferable remedy
would be for the legislature to state the legal effect of the joint account
in accord with the general understanding.
The legislature should first abolish all requirements that the
transfer conform to common law theories and then proceed to establish the new law. This might take the form of a unequivocal rule
of law that the funds shall belong to the surviving depositor. Several
states have such statutes30 and although these have been attacked as
being unconstitutional for resulting in a deprivation of property
without due process, 31 the passage of such statutes has generally been
held to be within the legislative power to alter the common law. 32
Since these statutes eliminate judicial inquiry as to actual intent, they
seem to give the survivor more protection than is desirable. Judicial
distaste for them is evidenced by the holdings that such statutes do
'Ala. Code, tit. 5,§ 128 (2a) 196o; Cal. Fin. Code § 852; Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev.,
§ 36-36 (1952); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 59, § i 9 -G-V-B (Supp. 1961); N. J. Rev.
Stat. § 17: 9A-218B (Supp. 1961); N.Y. Banking Law § 134(3).
' 1New Jersey uses the phrase "conclusively presumed" to indicate the establishment of a rule of law. See note 3 Supra.
nHill v. Badeljy, io7 Cal. App. 598, 29o Pac. 637 (1930); Ward v. Marine
Nat'l Bank, 38 N.J. 132, 183 A.2d 6o (1962); Heiner v. Greenvich Say. Bank, 18
Misc. 326, 193 N.Y.S. 291 (Sup. Ct. 1922) .
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not create binding rules in the absence of the strongest possible lan33
guage.
One writer 34 has suggested that this type of statute should be enlarged so as to recognize an alternative form of joint account which
provides survivorship. In the absence of fraud or mistake, upon the
death of the original depositor the remaining funds would go to the
decedent's estate.
A preferable statute would provide that funds of a joint deposit
shall belong to the survivor unless an adverse claimant can show by
"clear and convincing evidence" that the decedent did not intend such
a result. This would place upon the adverse claimant, with regard to
intent, the single controlling factor, the burden of going forward with
the evidence and the risk of nonpersuasion, both of which are now on
the survivor. This seems a reasonable burden in light of the words to
which the original depositor has affixed his signature.
This statute can also be extended to recognize the alternative form
of joint account with no mention of survivorship. Upon the death of
the original depositor the remaining funds would go to the decedent's
estate unless the survivor can present "dear and convincing evidence"
that the depositor intended otherwise. This type of account, providing
the convenience of the joint account without the incident of survivorship, would be governed by the same law as presently applies to the
joint-and-survivorship account.
Quesenberry v. Funk may not be the "hard case" that has prompted
other states to revise their laws regulating joint bank accounts. Yet
it does point out the wide disparity between the common law view
which the Virginia court takes, supported almost solely by tradition,
and the view which the public seems to take, supported by common
sense and logical language interpretation. Members of the legal and
banking professions should eliminate this difference either through
the education of the public or the modification of Virginia law. The
latter would seem to be the more fruitful approach.
CHAuLvs B. Rowe

13In Re Perrone, 5 N.J. 514, 76 A.2d 518 (195o).
"Kepner, supra note 8, 41 Calif. L. Rev. at 636-37.

